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Abstract
The transposition of  the theological expression into the framework of  epis-
temology suggested by the contemporary philosophy of science is a long-de-
sired project. The presented article offers an overview of the different episte-
mological and methodological issues that arise when this expression is carried 
out in the common sense paradigm. It turns that once the necessary change 
into the mode of knowledge acquisition of contemporary science is made, one 
can significantly improve theology’s both methodological and conceptual 
foundations. In particular, this concerns the use of abstract concepts to better 
penetrate the intricacies of the Divine nature as well as the non-classical logics 
to improve theology’s inferential basis. The resulting question of the contex-
tuality of theology, namely, its dependence on the conceptual framework and 
the picture of the world, is also surveyed. Consequently, theology can be per-
ceived as a lexically open project. In conclusion it is argued that while the con-
temporary theology should retain its common sense exposition for the pasto-
ral and catechetical purposes that allows for the efficient transmission of faith 
through intuitive knowledge, the state-of-the-art theological research must 
reach out to to abstract conceptual frameworks to assure the depth of its pen-
etrative insight.
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Introduction
Most of the readers who are about to read this article certainly expect 
that the main challenge towards theology formulated here will com-
mence from sophisticated scientific arguments. To their surprise, just 
the opposite will happen. Doing theology is by all means a noble task 
in itself but, ultimately, the exposition and explanation of the revealed 
truths should lead to  the strengthening of  faith. In other words, the 
measure of  theology is whether by providing a profound intellectual 
grasp of the Divine it is able to win converts. Theology must lead to the 
encounter of the living and transforming God, if  it fails achieve this 
it becomes like abstract mathematics: it treats of lofty things that hard-
ly anyone understands but – unlike mathematics – stands no chance 
of  finding a  respectable application. The brute fact is  that currently 
we are witnessing a crisis of faith. Once fortresses of faith and pillars 
of Christianity, the Western European countries face a visible collapse 
of their cultural identity that had in the past flourished nurtured by the 
vivifying spirit of the Gospel of Christ.
It is no surprise that calls for new evangelization are so abundant. 
Rarely, however, do these calls prompt for the reestablishment of what, 
following the thought of St. Augustine, St. Anselnm of Cantenbury 
would name fides quaerens intellectum, namely, the conterpunctual 
union of faith and reason that reached its climax in the Western me-
diaeval thought mostly through the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas.1 
After all, these are not emotions but the human intellect that firmly 
adheres to the truth. Although the proposals of the restoration of the 
faith are many, in this article I will be arguing that in order that faith 
in God main regain its broad impact in  society it  is imperative that 
it finds its way back into the human intellect. In other words, that the 
truth of  Revelation is  absorbed, lived and put into practice through 
a penetrating insight into the nature of the Divine things. It remains 
beyond doubt that this noble enterprize qualifies as one of the central 
tasks of  theology. By bringing in private moments of  reflection into 
a what is  expected to be a  scientific study I wish to  emphasize that 
the consideration presented in this article means to me more than just 
1 For an excellent exposition on the relations of faith and reason in the mediaeval 
thought see: J. Pieper, Scholasticsim: Personalities and Problems of Mediaeval Philosophy, 
South Bend 2001.
Theology Under Siege: Reflections… 9
to write another research paper and this is the reason why I feel par-
ticularly honored to be offered to initiate a hopefully fruitful discussion. 
Ultimately, it  is about deep understanding of and the most intimate 
relation with the One who gives sense to my existence.
As I will be trying to show, the contemporary theology too often 
fails to  enter into a  fruitful dialogue with many aspects of  human 
intellectual activity among which science plays the prominent role. 
It is a given fact that the mentality of the modern man is dominated 
by the scientific world view and for a good reason because science of-
fers precise explanations of the workings of nature acquired by means 
of rigoristic analytical methods yielding knowledge with a high degree 
of certitude. Moreover, it turns out that such methodology has already 
made its way into theology in the form of the so called analytic theology 
pursued largely by thinkers of the Anglosaxon provenience.2 Although 
lots of  efforts are being made to neutralize the conflict between sci-
ence and faith3 still some genuine scientific achievements are viewed 
as a danger to faith. For instance, this includes the theory of evolution 
which faces the frequent objection of materialism and the denial of fi-
nality due to its stochastic character.4 The claims of the cognitive sci-
ences seem to pose even more threat for they openly cast doubt on the 
adequacy of  such central theological concepts as  soul, free will and 
person. On the other hand, however, leading scientists who can claim 
substantial contributions to  the progress of  science such as  Stephen 
Hawking5 and Richard Dawkins6 promote scientific atheism assert-
ing that science yields sufficient grounds to deny the existence of God 
and to qualify supernatural religion as  a  sign of  intellectual immatu-
rity and retardation. In light of these tensions anyone who genuinely 
wishes to remain a believer and – at the same time – to seriously treat 
the achievements of  science as  the unveiling of  the Divine rational-
ity finds himself or herself in the state of intellectual cleavage of what 
in truth should present itself as a coherent picture emerging from God 
as a cause of everything that exists.
2 O. D. Crisp, M. C. Rea, Analytic Theology, Oxford 2009.
3 E.g., J. Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology, London 
1986.
4 E.g., G. J. Keane, Creation Rediscovered, Rockford–Illinois 1999.
5 S. Hawking, L. Mlodinow, The Great Design, London–Toronro–Sydney–Auck-
land–Johannesburg 2010.
6 R. Dawkins, The God Delusion, Boston–New York 2008.
Wojciech P. Grygiel10
After what has been a somewhat lengthy introduction, I wish to turn 
into a more rigorious survey of why I think that theology of today ne-
cessitates a  major overhaul on  both systematic and methodological 
levels. As a way of engaging in my inquiry, I wish to begin with a fa-
mous quote of St. Augustine from his Genesi ad Litteram. As its main 
focus, the quote challenges the credibility and the pastoral effectiveness 
of theologians who refuse to equip themselves with basic knowledge 
of the main tenets of the contemporary science. Here is what St. Au-
gustine says:
Usually, even a non-Christian knows something about the earth, the 
heavens, and the other elements of this world, about the motion and 
orbit of the stars and even their size and relative positions, about the 
predicable eclipses of the sun and moon, the cycles of the years and 
the seasons, about the kinds of animals, shrubs, stones, and so forth, 
and this knowledge he holds to as being certain from reason and ex-
perience. Now, it is a disgraceful and dangerous thing for an infidel 
to hear a Christian, presumably giving the meaning of Holy Scrip-
ture, talking nonsense on these topics; and we should take all means 
to  prevent such an  embarrassing situation, in  which people show 
up  vast ignorance in  a  Christian and laugh it  to scorn. The shame 
is not so much that an ignorant individual is derided, but people out-
side the household of  the faith think our sacred writers held such 
opinions, and, to the great loss for whose salvation we toil, the writers 
of our Scripture are criticized and rejected as unlearned men. If they 
find a  Christian mistaken in  a  field which they themselves know 
well and hear him maintaining his foolish opinions about our books, 
how are they going to believe those books in matters concerning the 
resurrection of  the dead, the hope of  eternal life, and the kingdom 
of heaven, when they think their pages are full of falsehoods on the 
facts which they themselves have learned from experience and the 
light of reason?7
In the first step I  formulate my main objection to  the contempo-
rary theology by pointing to the dominating reliance on the common 
7 St. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram i, 19–20, in: St. Augustine, Opera omnia, 
accurante J.-P. Migne, Parisiis 1865, col. 260f (Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series 
Latina, 34).
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sense notions in its discourse. I expand at some length what the major 
drawbacks of such state of affairs are and I explain why the conceptual 
foundation of the natural sciences points towards the use of abstract 
notions as  more adequate in  the description of  reality at  the funda-
mental level. In  particular, this concerns metaphysics applied in  the-
ology. Next I  move onto an  epistemological consideration in  which 
I wish to demonstrate that the common sense cognition is  a  special 
case of the way human mind grasps reality in general. I conclude this 
consideration with the presentation of the Skolem–Löwenheim Theo-
rem stating that truths of  faith can be expressed in a variety of  con-
ceptual systems (philosophies). This in  turn justifies the introduc-
tion of  the category of  the picture of  the world which is  very helpful 
in  showing the contextual character of  the expression of  theological 
truths. As  a  formal tool that would guarantee the precision of  con-
cepts applied I  introduce the method of  the invariants of  the con-
ceptual systems in analogy the common property of the key physical 
theories being the theories of invariants of the groups of transforma-
tions. Finally, I  arrive at  the conclusion that although the common 
sense representation of the truths of faith must be retained for a gen-
eral believer, the theological research must reach out to  the abstract 
conceptual frameworks to allow for a deeper insight into the Divine 
reality.
The Common Sense  
or Why Theology Limps
In the strictest sense, my main point of critique that I wish to voice 
at this point concerning theology is that it has not sufficiently enriched 
its method and conceptual content beyond what is warranted by the 
common sense knowledge. To  be more specific, this concerns three 
basic objections: (1) the common sense epistemology which confines 
the conceptual content to what is given in direct perception, (2) the 
resulting exclusive reliance on the common sense concepts as the only 
foundation to build theological knowledge, (3) the exclusive use of the 
Aristotelian two-valued logic as an inferential tool. As it has been al-
ready mentioned in the introduction, the following fundamental philo-
sophical concepts come to the fore: causality, substance, matter, space, 
time, free will, soul and person.
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The common sense is in itself a category that is somewhat difficult 
to define.8 For the purpose of this study, however, it will be assumed 
that to accept something on a  common sense basis means to accept 
it uncritically as self-evident in how it is perceived. The term has its ori-
gins in the Aristotelian philosophy and carries on two important mo-
ments: (1) that perceptions of things are shared by all and (2) that they 
constitute the foundation of knowledge that must be accepted without 
further inquiry into its adequacy.9 In other words, self-evidence is the 
ultimate reason to refrain from any form of critical approach. As I will 
venture out to demonstrate, the common sense knowledge termed of-
ten pre–scientific in the sense of being acquired before the onset of the 
contemporary scientific method reveals several aspects of  continu-
ity with the knowledge named as scientific. The natural consequence 
of such a state of affairs is that theology should expand its theoretical 
apparatus following to how it develops with the most advanced stan-
dards of knowledge.
Now let me  turn my  attention to  the two major drawbacks that 
make the common sense knowledge a  weak conceptual foundation 
for theology. These include: (1) the relative character of the common 
sense knowledge and (2) the inadequacy of the common sense concepts 
on the natural level of physical description. In regards to the first con-
cern, it is quite easy to observe that the commonality of the common 
sense, namely, its normalization and objectivity within a  large class 
of cognizing subjects is highly disputable due to the diversified charac-
ter of what actually becomes the object of the self-evident knowledge 
in the daily life experience. For instance, for anyone who lives on the 
surface of  the Earth the common sense experience is  that the Earth 
is indeed flat while for a pilot of a jet, on the other hand, the curvature 
of  the Earth registers as  a  self-evident truth. In  short, the common 
sense conceptual framework is  considerably relativized to  the cultur-
al and social condition and thus bears a contextual character. Instead 
of yielding an absolute conceptual foundation for theology, this frame-
work directly leads to epistemological relativism.
8 E.g., S.  Zabieglik, Krzywe zwierciadło filozofii, czyli dzieje pojęcia zdrowego 
rozsądku, Warszawa 1987.
9 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. III, 996 b; M. Krąpiec, Poznawać czy myśleć, Lublin 
1994, p. 247–255.
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The second drawback of  the common sense concepts in  theol-
ogy is that founding theological knowledge on these concepts results 
in  a  marked epistemological hindrance. This problem is  best exem-
plified through the specificity of  one of  the key physical theories 
of the 20th century, namely, quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics 
is a theory that provides the physical explanation of the phenomena 
at the atomic level with a high degree of accuracy. One of the main 
conundrums surrounding the theory is  the persisting lack of  its sat-
isfactory interpretation, that is, the relation of its theoretical entities 
to the observable objects of the physical reality.10 The main reason this 
is that the abstract character of the Hilbert space formalism of quan-
tum mechanics prevents to relate these two domains in a straightfor-
ward manner. If we make one step further, however, and claim that the 
theoretical structure of  quantum mechanics does indeed reflect the 
ontological structure of  the physical reality that underpins the phe-
nomenal, we end up with an abstract picture of  the physical reality 
radically incompatible with any common sense ontology.11 Moreover, 
if we regard the quantum mechanical theoretical structure as an ele-
ment of the Divine design of the Universe in which the Divine Nature 
itself is refracted, shouldn’t then this nature demand a description with 
a far more abstract conceptual framework than it applies at the natural 
level of physical reality? In other words, should not God in Himself 
be far more abstract compared with the abstractness of what He has 
created? In addition to  the abstractness we could add another term 
regarding the specificity of the mathematical structure that frequently 
invoked by Roger Penrose, namely, that of its sophistication.12 Inasmuch 
that the abstractness of a mathematical entity means its remoteness 
from the common sense, sophistication denotes the richness and the 
high level ordering of  the entity’s internal structure. To  put things 
in  short, should not God be  in His essence both infinitely abstract 
and sophisticated? Did not Einstein always maintain that “subtle is the 
Lord, but malicious He is not?”.
10 E.g., C. Isham, Lectures on Quantum Theory, London 1995.
11 An excellent testimony to the growing awareness of how quantum mechanics 
violates the common sense perception can be  found in: W. Heisenberg, Physics and 
Philosophy, New York 1958.
12 R. Penrose, What is reality?, in: B. Brożek, J. Mączka, W. P. Grygiel, Philosophy 
in Science: Methods and Applications, Kraków 2011, p. 25–32.
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Now let me provide a handful of examples illustrating how a strict 
adherence to common sense concepts and disregard for the fact that 
the progress of  science calls for their revision and development may 
lead to severe obstruction of a rational inquiry both on part of theology 
and science. The early critics launched against the theory of evolution 
were aimed as the defense against generally understood materialism.13 
It must be clearly remembered that the term materialism relies on the 
common sense understanding of matter as  a physical body confined 
to a spatiotemporal location an thus exposed to experience by human 
senses. Moreover, the common sense understanding perceives the ma-
terial to be in opposition to the immaterial following the Aristotelian 
hylemorphism where matter remains entirely passive and can only play 
a  role of  a  receptacle of  immaterial forms. If  such perspective is  ad-
opted – as it had been the case in the 19th century and it seems to be 
to a noticeable degree now – mater cannot be the source of organiza-
tion out of itself for then it takes on the Divine creative role and poses 
a threat to the existence of God Creator altogether. The common sense 
understanding of matter, however, did not migrate into the discourse 
of the physical sciences and was entirely eliminated from for these sci-
ences that exclusively employ abstract mathematical structures in the 
theoretical account of the observed phenomena14. The explanation why 
human cognitive apparatus conceptualizes physical reality as  objects 
restricted to a spatiotemporal location containing mass belongs to the 
domain of  the cognitive sciences in which the physical sciences may 
eventually play a significant role.
A separate line of argumentation voiced against the theory of evo-
lution rests on the common sense interpretation of probability. If, fol-
lowing Aristotle, probability or – more precisely – chance is interpret-
ed as  the lack of  rationality and that chance is only due to  the lack 
of  knowledge of  causes then the stochastic character of  the natural 
selection truly seems like a violation of the rational scientific method.15 
However, what seems irrational to  the common sense perception 
13 Concilium Vaticanum  II, Constotutio dogmatica Dei Filius, Canones, 1. De 
Deo rerum omnium creatore, in: H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum 
et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, a cura di P. Hünermann, Bologna 2003, no. 3021, 
3022.
14 M. Heller, Ewolucja pojęcia masy, in: M. Heller, A. Michalik, J. Życiński (red.), 
Filozofować w kontekście nauki, Kraków 1987, p. 161–163.
15 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1065a; Physics, 197a.
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receives its conceptual support as one moves to abstract mathematical 
structures. It turns out that mathematics offers an axiomatized theory 
of probability in which thanks to the works of Kolmogorov probability 
is founded on the mathematically sound theory of measure. Moreover, 
physical sciences clearly attest to the rationality of probability for there 
are instances of  theories incorporating probability to  its formalism 
whereby they yield excellent empirical predicitions.16 If probability can 
be associated with the scientific rationality of the mathematical type, 
then the arguments accusing the theory of evolution of its alleged ir-
rational character lose their support.17
Much greater challenge to the common sense conceptualization and 
its adequacy, however, seems to be coming from within the cognitive 
sciences. The rapid development of these sciences in recent decades has 
shown the need to revise the conceptual content of such key concepts 
in  theology such as soul, free will and person. In short, the cognitive 
sciences call for the in–depth restructuring of anthropology that fringes 
upon the meaning and understanding of human spirituality. In this sur-
vey I wish to devote more more attention to the notion of soul.18 Its ori-
gins reach back to the ancient Greece and it is thanks to Aristotle that 
we have inherited the tripartite sharp distinction between the vegetative, 
sensory (animal) and the rational (human) soul.19 The distinctive fea-
tures of the human soul include reason and free will. It is not an exag-
geration to state that such an understanding of anthropology underpins 
the entire classical and contemporary theological discourse placing the-
ology on extremely shaky conceptual foundations. Michael Tomasello 
brings forth an  intriguing empirical argument to  criticize the notion 
of the soul thus conceptualized.20 He states that until the 19th century 
16 The two main theories that base their formalism on probability are statistical 
mechanics and quantum mechanics. Inasmuch as in statistical mechanics probability 
plays only the statistical role and thus bears the epistemological character, the quantum 
probability reflects the probabilistic nature of the microworld. Moreover, both types 
of probabilities engage different mathematical foundations.
17 M.  Heller, Philosophy of  Chance. A  Cosmic Fugue with a  Prelude and a  Coda, 
Kraków 2012.
18 For an excellent review of the transformation of the concept of the soul from 
the point of view of the cognitive science see: J. Brehmer, Pojęcie duszy w naukach kog-
nitywnych, Filozofia Chrześcijańska 7 (2010), p. 37–63.
19 Aristotle, On the Soul, 413a-432b.
20 M. Tomasello, Historia naturalna ludzkiego myślenia, Kraków 2015, p. 255–256.
Wojciech P. Grygiel16
the full information necessary to properly spell out how the human spe-
cies differs from animals was unavailable. The “European experience” 
made a  false impression of  a  marked gap between man and animals 
as observed within his own household consisting of birds, cats, dogs and 
sometimes wolves and foxes. The missing information came with the 
acquisition of hominids into the European zoos. In order to make his 
account more colorful, he recalls the visit of the British queen Victoria 
in the London Zoo when in response to her encounter with the orang-
utan Jenny she exclaimed that “it was unpleasantly human.”
Be that as  it may, the important revision into the understanding 
of  the nature of  the human soul is  that its difference in  comparison 
to the animal (sensitive) soul becomes significantly blurred. As Toma-
sello clearly points out, the hominids are capable of using the cognitive 
self-control as opposed to the mere behavioral self-control proper to the 
classically understood sensitive soul.21 The thinking activity of the homi-
nids involves three components: (1) the ability to use abstract cognitive 
representations and to  locate particular experiences within their net-
work, (2) the ability to make inferences based on these representations 
and (3) the ability to track the process of their own decision making.22 
The major difference of these cognitive abilities of the humanoids with 
respect to the humans, however, consists in that these abilities support 
competition and exploitation of  others rather than cooperation and 
communication as it is the case for humans. Furthermore, the blurring 
of the rational – sensitive barrier finds its conformation in the somatic 
markers hypothesis advanced by Antonio Damasio. On this view, the deci-
sion-making process in heavily influenced by the emotional responses.23 
Finally, the nature of the decisive making process itself can be advanced 
as the last example of the inadequacy of the sharp distinction between 
the sensitive and the human soul. It  is currently maintained that this 
process is not a movement of the free will as single power of the rational 
soul but it is a complex scheme of processes combining concerted action 
of the distinct neuronal structures of the human brain.24
21 M. Tomasello, Historia naturalna, p. 50.
22 M. Tomasello, Historia naturalna, p. 53–59.
23 A. Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain, New York 
2010.
24 S. A. Spence, The Actor’s Brain: Exploring the Cognitive Science of Free Will, Ox-
ford 2009.
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One needs to remember, however, that instances of the conceptual 
dogmatism cemented by  philosophical standpoints can be  pointed 
out in the history of science as well. For instance, Newton’s insistence 
on the corpuscular character of light was an obstacle to its competing 
undulatory representation supported by the famous two-slit Young ex-
periment and the eventual development of quantum mechanics. Fur-
thermore, the absolutization of the Newtonian dynamics by Immanuel 
Kant whereby he  elevated the Euclidean spatiotemporal perception 
into the status of a priori categories of perception hindered the devel-
opment of geometry by obstructing the discovery of the non-Euclid-
ean geometries. Had this obstacle been not removed, Einstein’s gen-
eral theory of relativity would never have been formulated. And finally, 
it is Einstein himself who was not willing to give up his philosophical 
convictions leading him to introduce the cosmological constant in his 
field equation to secure the static picture of the Universe and to engage 
in a heated debate with Niels Bohr whether physical reality can be gov-
erned by indeterministic laws as stipulated by quantum mechanics. In-
asmuch as in the first case Einstein admitted it to be one of his greatest 
errors, he has never quit his strongest conviction that “God does not 
play dice.” Be it science or theology, the following quote from Einstein 
equally applies to both:
Concepts which turned out to be useful in the ordering [of experience], 
gain such an  authority for us, that we  easily forget of  its terrestrial 
origin and we accept them as having the characteristics of an unchang-
ing reality. Consequently, we assign them the status of “the necessities 
of thought,” “the a priori data” etc. Errors of this kind often pose a bar-
rier to the scientific progress.25
No Metaphysics, No Science
There exists a widespread opinion that science has proven metaphys-
ics to be a purely rhetorical enterprize devoid of sense and incapable 
of  producing knowledge. This standpoint, however, rests on  the neo-
positivistic view of science with the criterion of empirical verifiability 
as the sole criterion of scientific rationality. Studies in the history and 
25 A. Einstein, Ernst Mach, Physikalische Zeitschrift 17/7 (1916), p. 101–104.
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philosophy of science have clearly demonstrated that physical theories 
make an ample use of objects that are not empirically verifiable and 
yet play central role in the mathematical formalism of a given theory.26 
For instance, physical fields such as  gravitational or  electromagnetic 
qualify as metaphysical in the Kantian sense of entities remaining out-
side of the realm of experience. Moreover, contemporary debates in the 
philosophy of science center on the issue of the scientific realism, that 
is, the question whether scientific theories can be  considered to  for-
mulate approximate truth statements regarding the mind-independent 
physical reality.27 Interestingly enough, the position of  the structural 
realism implies that realism thus understood pertains not to objects but 
to structures.28 Clearly enough, formalized sciences have retained their 
ability to predicate of the extramental realities.
Metaphysics in  theology serves primarily as  the preamble of  faith 
where certain truths are acquired by  the light of  the natural reason 
thereby giving a  foundation for the acceptance of  revelation as  ra-
tional. A proof of  the existence of God is  an example of  the pream-
ble. For instance, the Aristotelian metaphysics with the corrections 
introduced to  it by  St. Thomas Aquinas gave the foundation to  the 
Thomistic theology. Similarly, a  theology may be  constructed using 
Hegelian metaphysics.29 In  a  broader sense, metaphysics is  neces-
sary in  theology to  assure the rationality of  discourse engaging the-
oretical entities in  its narration that cannot be  related to  experience. 
As a continuation of what has been argued so far, the objections to the 
use of  a  common sense conceptual framework can now be  applied 
to metaphysics in view of  its use in  theology. In short, any common 
sense based metaphysics must admit of  its relative and non-abstract 
character.
In order to see how a more appropriate metaphysics could be iden-
tified, I  wish to  recall the relation of  physics to  metaphysics in  the 
26 E.g., A. Chakravartty, A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unob-
servable, Cambridge 2007.
27 E.g., S. Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, London–New York 
1999.
28 J.  Worall, Structural Realism: The Best of  Both Worlds?, Dialectica 43  (1989), 
p. 99–124.
29 E.g., P.  C. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology: A  Reading of  the Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Religion, Oxford 2005.
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common sense based philosophy of Aristotle.30 Inasmuch as metaphys-
ics also termed the first philosophy deals with the analysis of ens qua 
ens in abstraction from physics, metaphysics remains conceptually de-
pendent on the physics of its origin. As Obolevich explains: “The ob-
ject of the metaphysical consideration is often located at the extension 
of a natural inquiry and culminates in it.” The obvious conclusion that 
I wish to  stress now is  the following: if  contemporary physics offers 
a  much greater insight into the workings of  nature, should not the 
metaphysics built upon it  lead to  a  much deeper grasp of  what the 
most fundamental principles of  ens qua ens are? One of  the most fa-
mous and yet controversial examples of such an attempt is the process 
philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead.31 The search for a new meta-
physics – on the other hand – was openly contested by Józef Bocheński. 
He claimed that the complexity and diversity of contemporary knowl-
edge makes any synthesis of the scholastic type impossible and only the 
analytical approach is justified.32
An Epistemological Consideration
In the next step I wish to deepen my criticism towards absolutizing 
conceptual frameworks in  theology and restricting them to  the com-
mon sense by turning to an epistemological problem of the acquisition 
of the theological knowledge. Theology exercised in the common sense 
Aristotelian–Thomistic paradigm in  particular rests on  the epistemo-
logical assumption that knowledge is  acquired by means abstraction 
of the forms of things that exist in the physical reality independently 
of the human mind. In short, this implies that we get to know things 
as they are. The Aristotelian–Thomistic epistemology takes this stand-
point as its fundamental assumption and claims that thus the objectiv-
ity of  cognition is  properly secured. In  such perspective, the human 
30 T. Obolevitch, Kilka uwag na temat relacji fizyki i metafizyki u Arystotelesa, in: 
S. Wszołek, R. Janusz (red.), Wyzwania racjonalności, Kraków 2006, p. 472–486.
31 The seminal ideas are contained in Whitehead’s Process and Reality. For exten-
sive discussion see, e.g., L. S. Ford, The Viability of Whitehead’s God for Christian Theology, 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 44 (1970), p. 141–151; 
J. Życiński, Teizm i filozofia analityczna, t. 2, Kraków 1988, p. 157–254.
32 J. Bocheński, Między logiką i wiarą: Z Józefem Bocheńskim rozmawia Jan Parys, 
Montricher 1992, p. 77–94.
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mind is entirely passive and cognition is understood as the commence-
ment of the existence of a particular form impressed upon the mind. 
Such mechanism of cognition is considered as self-evident and further 
inquiry into its nature is usually eschewed.33
Moreover, the Aristotelian–Thomistic epistemology rests on an on-
tological assumption that the existence of things is prior to their cog-
nition by the human mind and that cognition is made possible solely 
on the assumption of the existence of its object in the external physi-
cal reality. I will make an effort to show that such an inference relies 
on a series of arbitrary assumptions which – once revealed – show why 
the inverse is true, namely, that the Aristotelian–Thomistic epistemol-
ogy takes on as self-evident and real what indeed is a mental construct 
contingent upon the ontological standpoint of the direct (naive) realism. 
According to this standpoint, things are taken to exist as they are per-
ceived and that they are the objects of direct experience. Consequently, 
the human mind is capable of attaining truths on the external reality 
according to the correspondence theory of truth.
In light of  the works of  the two influential philosophers, David 
Hume and Immanuel Kant, the cognitive mechanism maintained 
by the Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition demands a major overhaul. It is 
frequently maintained by the strict adherents of this tradition that both 
Hume and Kant have destroyed the realistic metaphysics and realistic 
epistemology.34 However, I would like to present a more balanced opin-
ion in that matter by claiming that instead of being destructive by their 
critical approach they revealed the arbitrary assumptions hidden in this 
tradition and thus enabled further scientific progress. Moreover, their 
critical approach did not abolish the claims of  the the Aristotelian–
Thomistic heritage but – on the contrary – it helped to demonstrate 
the range of  its applicability. This strategy is  analogical, for instance, 
to how the fifth postulate of the Euclidean geometry has been proven 
to be an arbitrary assumption once the generalized non-Euclidean ge-
ometries were discovered.
Multiple volumes have been devoted to  the study of  Hume’s 
and Kant’s legacy. For the purpose of  this study, however, it  is suffi-
cient to bring out the most important tenets of their ontological and 
33 An  in-depth exposition of  the Aristotelian–Thomistic epistemology can be 
found in: J. Owens, Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry, Huston 1992.
34 E.g., E. Gilson, Methodical Realism, Front Royal 1990.
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epistemological doctrine to  shed the necessary light at  the problem 
in hand. In case of David Hume the central tenet is  the distinction 
between the relations of ideas and the matters of fact. As a result, Hume 
released the necessary relation between the conceptual and the factual 
whereby the necessity of thought no longer implied necessity on the 
part of the objective reality. It is on that basis Hume launched his fa-
mous attack on the notion of causality. The contribution of Kant, on the 
other hand, consisted in showing that the human mind plays an active 
role in the human condition. Clearly, he went too far by absolutizing 
the Newtonian mechanics as he insisted on the a priori character of the 
spatiotemporal categories by means of which the human mind struc-
tures experience whereby Kant became an  obstacle in  the discovery 
of the non-Euclidean geometries. The active role of the human mind 
in  representing the external reality, however, finds its solid confirma-
tion in the contemporary cognitive sciences.
The lifting of  the assumption of  the necessary relation between 
the ideas and the facts as well as the postulate of the active (critical) 
role of the human mind lead into a situation in which in the process 
of  cognition the mind equipped with its conceptual framework con-
fronts the sensory material in  a  manner in  which it  cannot uncriti-
cally abstract forms from but the sensory content has to be absorbed 
within the pre-existing conceptual framework. By way of analogy from 
mathematics, this situation can be likened to a vector being projected 
into a coordinate system where the vector takes on the role of an em-
pirically established proposition and the coordinate system assumes 
the role of a  conceptual framework. As a  result, different coordinate 
systems will yield different coordinates of  the physically same vector 
whereby their active role comes to  the fore. Two important remarks 
need to be made at  this point. Firstly, it  is easily seen that the Aris-
totelian–Thomistic epistemology based on the direct realism is a par-
ticular case where a conceptual framework is selected that is generally 
covariant with the sensory content. General covariance is a technical 
mathematical term that plays a key role in Einstein’s theory of relativity 
whereby Einstein achieved the total independence of the field equation 
from the choice of the coordinate system.35 Given that the human mind 
35 E.g., J. Norton, The Physical Content of General Covariance, in: J. Eisenstaedt, 
A. Knox (eds.), Studies in the History of General Relativity: Einstein Studies, vol. 3, Bos-
ton 1992, p. 281–315.
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is furnished with conceptual content of an extremely diversified prove-
nience, the conceptual framework generally covariant with the sensory 
material can be qualified as an extremely special case of all conceptual 
frameworks resident in the human mind. This shows clearly that Hume 
and Kant combined did not contribute to the collapse of the the Aris- 
totelian–Thomistic tradition  – but to  the contrary  – they ultimately 
helped in  clarifying its limitations. Secondly, the proposed analogy 
greatly assists in understanding why the content of a particular sensory 
material may be projected into a variety of conceptual systems instead 
of being rigidly restricted to the covariant one. However, what is most 
important from the point of this study, this conclusion justifies the ap-
plicability of different philosophical systems to the exposition of the 
Divinely revealed truths and gives a definite warning against the abso-
lutization of any conceptual frameworks as foundational for theology.
As a last argument in the polemics with the aforementioned absolu-
tization, I wish to resort to the inherent properties of the formal systems 
implied by  the Skolem–Löwenheim Theorem.36 The theorem stipulates 
that there exist many models (interpretations) for a given logical for-
mula. Strictly speaking, this concerns the formulation of a set of axioms 
that allow for the specification of the properties of a given set of objects. 
In light of the theorem, a set of axioms will turn out true in many do-
mains leading to the semantic indeterminacy of language. As Życiński 
clearly points out, the effect of the Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem on the 
language can be compared to the role that the Heisenberg indetermi-
nacy principle plays in physics by  restricting the use of  the language 
of the classical physics in the domain of quantum mechanics. The im-
portance of the Skolem-Löwenheim in theology manifests itself in that 
it poses a definitive epistemological barrier to the enthronization of any 
conceptual system as  a  preferred one in  the exposition of  the truths 
of  faith. In  other words, each conceptual system carries on  intrinsic 
limitation of its explanative power thereby showing its relative character. 
There is no doubt that the Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem casts a shade 
of  epistemological skepticism on  the theological enterprize exercised 
in a mode narrowed down to a particular conceptual system.
36 For the in-depth analysis of the content and the philosophical consequences 
of the Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem see: J. Życiński, Teizm i filozofia analityczna, t. 2, 
Kraków, p.  18–46; J. Życiński, Świat matematyki i  jej materialnych cieni, Kraków 2013, 
p. 121–134.
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Pictures of the World
With the proper epistemological tools in hand, now I wish to  focus 
on how these tools maybe of assistance in providing a foundation for 
the theological inquiry. In  a way, this is  a possible contribution into 
a  long lasting struggle of theology to recover after the attack on the 
credibility of theological knowledge launched by David Hume. In par-
ticular, the Humean critics of  metaphysics undermined the classical 
rational foundation of theology. In her penetrating book entitled Theol-
ogy in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, Nancey Murphy surveys the dif-
ferent proposals on how the claims of theology can be justified in the 
paradigm of  the paradigm of  the probable knowledge proper to  the 
method of the contemporary science.37 In particular she concentrates 
on the application of the idea of research programs proposed by Imre 
Lakatos to theology. Inasmuch as such an approach offers a possible 
setting of theological inquiry in accordance with the scientific method, 
I prefer to resort to a more fundamental conceptual analysis which was 
clearly signaled by Ian Barbour as he suggested the application of the 
theory of models to theology.38
As Heller clearly points out, theology has its origin in the meeting 
of  the human thought with the Revelation.39 This statement well ac-
cords with the epistemological situation presented above where a  re-
vealed truth is projected into the contextually conditioned conceptual 
content of  a  human mind. For instance, the New Testament revela-
tion was received in the context of the amalgamate of the Greek, Ro-
man and Hebrew cultures. In order to subject these complex processes 
to  a more rigorious analysis, I will follow the line of  argumentation 
put forward by  Heller and Liana.40 In  order to  properly clarify this 
issue, a hermeneutical category of the picture of the world is introduced. 
According to Liana, the picture of the world is firstly “a certain com-
plete set of  convictions on  the fundamental characteristics and the 
mode of  the functioning of  the Universe, man and cognition itself.” 
37 N. Murphey, Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, Ithaca–London 1990.
38 I. Barbour, Myths, Models, Paradigms. A Comparative Study of Science and Reli-
gion, New York 1976.
39 M. Heller, Wszechświat i słowo, Kraków 1981, p. 16.
40 Z. Liana, Teologia a naukowe obrazy świata, in: J. Mączka (red.), Wiara i nauka, 
Kraków 2010, p. 70–71.
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And, secondly, Liana expands by adding that the picture of the world 
is  “a  certain intellectual background or  a  specific background knowl-
edge of all possible cognitive behaviors of man with the theological and 
scientific cognition inclusive.” Clearly then, the category of the picture 
of the world allows to bring out the relativization of cognition to the 
historical conditioning of  the cognizing subject whereby cognition 
becomes a  function of  culture and language. Consequently, as Liana 
stresses, the historical conditioning of the subject implies that no pure, 
absolute, subject-independent knowledge is ever possible.
The history of philosophy, however, yields examples where the influ-
ence of the subject’s condition on knowledge acquisition was neutral-
ized where only the object of cognition would exclusively determine 
the content of  knowledge. The Aristotelian epistemology discussed 
above yields such an example. If this scheme were transferred to the 
area of religious cognition, the entire passivity of the cognizing subject 
would imply that God could directly communicate Himself to man 
thus shortcircuiting all human cognitive powers. Therefore, it  seems 
that claiming the existence of the Divine semantics, namely, that there 
exist notions by which God can directly make Himself known to the 
human mind, would imply the absolute character of  all religious be-
liefs. In other words, truths on the Divine nature would become known 
to men in an intuitive rather than a discursive manner. The assumption 
that there exists a revealed and universally valid conceptual knowledge 
exclusively designed for the communication of the Divine truths turns 
out to be entirely ill-founded. This is succinctly summarized by Józef 
Bocheński in the following quote:
Religion is written with a human language and as such it has to obey 
the laws of human semantics. It  is a great error of  theologians who 
claim that if  religion is given by an outside-of-this-world agent, the 
rules of the human semiotics don’t apply to it. And this is not true.
The application of the category of the picture of the world comes 
to a great assistance in clarifying two crucial moments in how the theo-
logical language functions in the expression of the truths of faith. First 
of  them relates to  the obvious problem of  the interpretation of  the 
Sacred Scriptures. In particular, the literal interpretation taken to the 
extreme implies that, as Liana rightly points out, “the revealed truth 
exactly matches the literal content of the text and this content could 
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be always and everywhere identically understood.” The key issue from 
the point of  view of  this study is  to emphasize that if  the literal in-
terpretation of  the scriptural text is  treated too rigidly, it  can easily 
lead to the absolutization of the picture of the world contained in it. 
This in turn results in immediate conflicts between the teachings of the 
Scriptures and the evolving picture of the world achieved on the natu-
ral level where the picture generated by the sciences plays a dominant 
role. The category of the picture of the world helps to understand why 
the scriptural message had to be relativized to the picture of the day 
and that the language in which the Revelation is  formulated always 
bears the historically and culturally conditioned subjective component 
of the one to whom it was communicated. The account of the creation 
of the Universe by God in the Book of Genesis is the most frequently 
quoted example in this regard.41
The second and far more contentious issue where the category 
of the picture of the world comes to the fore is the function of language 
in dogmatic definitions. Currently, the theologians speak of a phenom-
enon called the development of  doctrine or, in  the stronger sense, the 
development of  dogma.42 The idea fared quite badly as  far as  the dec-
larations of  the Magisterium of  the Church. It was numerous times 
charged with relativism and eventually qualified as modernist.43 One 
needs to remember, however, that in order to be able to declare some-
thing as relativistic it is necessary to point out an absolute with respect 
to which relativism can be identified. As I took pains to demonstrate 
so  far the the Aristotelian–Thomistic conceptual framework on  the 
basis of which the Church claimed the absolute character of  its con-
ceptual framework practically until Vaticanum II does not fulfill these 
standards. The truth is that the burden of the proof of the absolute char-
acter of this framework rests in the hands of its proponents! As I will 
now venture out to show, the relation between the picture of the world 
applied in the expression of a truth of faith and the content of the truth 
itself turns out to be so intimate that the change of the picture of the 
world may affect the very understanding of the given truth. In particu-
lar, I wish to focus on the controversial issue of the Divine action in the 
Universe which was the subject of  a  series of  conferences organized 
41 E. g., Pius XII, Encyclical Letter Humani Generis, 1950.
42 E.g., International Theological Commission, The Interpretation of Dogma, 1989.
43 Pius X, Encyclical Letter Pascendi, 1907.
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by the the Vatican Observatory (Rome, Italy) and the Center for The-
ology and the Natural Sciences in Berkeley (USA) bearing the common 
title Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action.44
The characterization of the way God acts in the Universe demands 
a model through which one can conceptualize how the Divine causali-
ty may interfere within the created order to carry out the decrees of the 
Divine Providence. Before the onset of  the contemporary scientific 
method whereby the ontologies spanned by the theoretical formalisms 
offered a viable alternative, the prevailing model was founded upon the 
Aristotelian concept of causality visualized as an agency exercising its 
causal influence by means of a physical contact with the thing moved. 
Hence comes the Aristotelian dictum omne quod movetur ab alio move-
tur as well as  the idea of  the motionless Primus Movens, the origin 
of all motion.45 The natural order of things was determined by the to-
tality of their natures with the possibility of a direct Divine interven-
tion aimed at the execution of special tasks reaching out beyond the 
entire natural order.46 This doctrine bears the name of interventionism 
and was crucial to the classical ontological understanding of miracles 
precisely as interventions of the Divine causality beyond what is war-
ranted by the competence of the natural causes. Also, the doctrine gave 
the strong support for the transcendence of God where a clear line could 
be drawn between the natural and the supernatural. The advent of the 
contemporary scientific method offering the account of the workings 
of the Universe by means of theories using abstract mathematical for-
malisms as  their foundation, however, forced a  major change in  the 
model of the Divine action within the natural order by shifting the em-
phasis on the immanence of God through the laws of nature rather that 
being ontologically entirely other as is the case in the classical model. 
This conclusion finds its expression in the doctrine of panentheism with 
Arthur Peacocke as one of its most prominent figures where the created 
44 E.g., R.  J. Russell, P.  Clayton, K.  Wegter-McNelly, J.  Polkinghorne, Quan-
tum Mechanics: Scientific Perspectives on  Divine Action, California 1995; R.  J. Russell, 
N. Murphy, A. Peacocke, Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 
California 2001.
45 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VIII; Metaphysics, Bk. XII.
46 E.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles,  III, 77, http://www.cor-
pusthomisticum.org/scg3064.html (20.11.2016).
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order is represented as immersed in God.47 It is not unlikely that such 
a change of the model of the Divine action may even call for a refor-
mulation of the fundamental understanding of the nature of God. For 
instance, the possibility of God’s mutability in its interaction with the 
world is often conveyed by the God’s body metaphor.48 There is no doubt 
that this inference stands in clear opposition to the classical doctrine 
on the immutable nature of God. Such state of affairs manifestly points 
to a more fundamental role of the picture of the world than being just 
a variable vehicle of an invariable truth. Are there any remedies to as-
sure that the objective character of truth will in some way be nonethe-
less retained?
A Quest for Objectivity
As I now move on to how remedy the concern formulated above, I wish 
to begin with the proposal of the lexically open philosophy put forward 
by Józef Życiński.49 He suggests that the best analogy for its support 
can be  drawn from mathematics where given axiomatic systems are 
often enriched and improved to assure their better adequacy as foun-
dations of the inferential systems. Similarly, in philosophy this should 
be refracted in the continuing effort to enrich the conceptual capacity 
of a given language to increase its explanative power in the penetration 
and interpretation of new areas of reality discovered by the natural sci-
ences. As one source of enrichment Życiński names the mutual interac-
tion between different conceptual systems whereby concepts from one 
system may benefit by gaining new content available only as they begin 
to  participate in  the discourse formulated outside of  the framework 
of their origin. Of course, as Życiński observes, this kind of enrichment 
must be subjected so strict analytical methods in order to prevent the 
unjustified dispersion and mixing of the conceptual contents and the 
ultimate blurring of the otherwise clearly stated semantic boundaries.
47 For a  concise introduction into panentheism in  theology can be  found in: 
M. W. Brierley, Naming a Quiet Revolution: The Panentheistic Turn in Modern Theology, 
in: P. Clayton, A. Peacocke (eds.), In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: 
Panentheistic Reflections on  God’s Presence in  a  Scientific World, Grand Rapids–Cam-
bridge 2004, p. 1–14.
48 E.g., S. McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology, Minneapolis 1993.
49 J. Życiński, Teizm i filozofia analityczna, p. 39–46.
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In my opinion, the methods of invariants of the conceptual systems 
qualifies as a suitable analytical tool in this regard.50 The first intuition 
for such an approach can be directly gleaned from the specificity of the 
category of the pictures of the world. As it has been stated above, this 
category is expected to allow for the delineation of the contextual layer 
of  the picture of  the world involved in a  theological statement from 
the invariable truth of faith that such a statement is supposed to me-
diate. The use of  the method of  the invariants was tacitly suggested 
by Michał Heller in his support for the philosophical pluralism in the-
ology.51 It  certainly echoes one of  the most important characteristics 
of many contemporary formalized physical theories, namely, their be-
ing theories of invariants of a group of certain transformations.52 This 
the main thesis of  the Erlangen program put forward by Felix Klein, 
one of the most renowned German mathematicians of the turn of the 
19th and 20th century.53 The main idea of applying the methods of invari-
ants consists in extending its use to the conceptual systems or, more 
broadly speaking, philosophies whereby what remains an  invariant 
in a set of conceptual systems qualifies for an objective truth freed from 
any contextuality. As I have shown in my study, the method yields also 
a valuable tool in identifying the artifacts of conceptual systems which 
cannot be used in the articulation of any objective truths of faith. The 
results of  the studies on  the application of  the method of  invariants 
of the conceptual systems are still quite preliminary and they will re-
quire a more in-depth inquiry into the theory of invariants.
The last point that I wish to make concerns the use of logic in the-
ology. The strict adherence to  the common sense ontology discussed 
above ontology is refracted in the structure of our language which al-
lows us to make inferences based on the two valued Aristotelian logic 
with the principle of non-contradiction as  its primary tool. The upshot 
50 E.g., W. P. Grygiel, Physics in the Service of Theology: A Methodological Inquiry, 
in: B. Brożek, A. Olszewski, M. Hohol, Logic in Theology, Kraków 2013, p. 293–308.
51 M. Heller, Wszechświat i słowo, p. 26–27.
52 For instance, the special theory of relativity is the theory of invariants of the 
Lorentz group, the general relativity is the theory of the invariants of the groups of dif-
feomorphisms, quantum mechanics is the theory of the invariants of the groups of per-
mutations and the standard model of elementary particles is the theory of the local 
gropus of gauge transformations,
53 E.g., R. Torretti, Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré, London 1978, 
p. 137–142.
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of such an approach is that the logical necessity with the factual neces-
sity are equated. In other words, whatever is  logically inferred is  au-
tomatically assumed to  mind-independently exist in  the objective 
reality. This property of  the Aristotelian logic was clearly articulated 
by a famous Polish logician, Jan Łukasiewicz.54 Moreover, Łukasiewicz 
also argued that the principle of  non-contradiction is  not an  abso-
lute rule of  logic and a  foundation of  any other logical systems but 
the multi-valued logical systems not respecting this principle are also 
possible. This conclusion gives a clear support to the postulate I have 
been arguing in a previous paragraph, namely, that the common sense 
conceptual framework is but a special case of all possible frameworks 
with any degree of abstractness and sophistication. By way of extension, 
the common sense logic constitutes a  special case of a more general 
logic with the principle of non-contradiction introduced as  its basic 
law. This brings us  to the idea of  the systems of  the paraconsistent 
logic which admit of contradictory statements and are more consonant 
with the logic of  human beliefs.55 Also, the systems of  the paracon-
sistent logic have the property of not leading to explosion due to the 
classical principle ex  contradictione quodlibet. From the point of  view 
of this study, however, a special class of paraconsistent systems of logic 
is  worth pointing out, namely, the inconsistency-adaptive logic formu-
lated by Diderik Batens.56 According to this logic, one should apply the 
rules of classical logic as long as contradictions do not occur and switch 
to the paraconsistent regime as soon as the classical system shows signs 
of explosion. As Dadaczyński clearly points out, the methodological 
chaos reigns in  “that paradigm of  theology, which maybe aptly de-
scribed as ‘touched by the spirit of Hegel’” due to the explicit tolerance 
of contradictions and is in need of urgent attention. Consequently, tak-
ing into account several other considerations he concludes that there 
are no grounds for “the meta-theological acceptance of contradictions 
occuring in theology.”57
54 J. Łukasiewicz, O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa, Warszawa 1987.
55 A more detailed analysis of  the role of  the paraconsistent logic in  religious 
thinking can be found in: M. Heller, Sens życia i sens Wszechświata, Tarnów 2002, p. 86–
110.
56 D. Batens, A General Characterization of Adaptive Logics, Logique et Analyse 
173–175 (2001), p. 45–68.
57 J.  Dadaczyński, What Kind of  Logic Does Contemporary Theology Need?, in: 
B. Brożek, A. Olszewski, M. Hohol, Logic in Theology, p. 39–60.
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Conclusions
As the course of this study comes to a close, one may rightly wonder 
whether ultimately every believer will be expected to be proficient in sci-
ence to secure rational support his or her faith. As I strived to show, this 
is obviously not the case for the common sense cognition is suitable for 
the catechetical purposes and for the teaching of faith in that it yields 
conceptual tools capable of giving sufficient grasp of the content of the 
truths of faith. This is guaranteed by the fact that the common sense 
cognition can be considered as a special case of the human cognition 
in general which, in my opinion, reaches the maximum of their possi-
bilities in the scientific method as it employs abstract and sophisticated 
concepts (and possibly the non-Aristotelian logic) in the description 
of physical reality at the fundamental level. To put things in short, both 
the common sense and the scientific method indeed bring us  closer 
to the truth although the scientific method does it to a much greater 
degree. Such type of epistemological rationality was famously termed 
by Karl Popper as verisimilitude.58 It  remains beyond doubt that the 
exclusive suitability of the abstract conceptual framework to theologi-
cal research would almost lead to gnosticism where the full knowledge 
of  the things Divine would be  restricted only to  the elect. As  I  ex-
plained, the great advantage of the common sense mediated knowledge 
is that its conceptual content is sufficient to reflect the truths of faith 
by means of  concepts with which the cognitive apparatus of  any be-
liever – educated or uneducated – is equipped. This, however, does not 
justify the theological research to rest on the assumption that the com-
mon sense based knowledge exhausts the quest for the theological truth. 
On  the contrary, following the challenge of St. Augustine presented 
at the outset of this study it should become the primary focus of theo-
logians to reach out to the abstract conceptual frameworks developed 
within the formalized sciences to assure that the study of the things 
Divine will return most sophisticated and in-depth knowledge on the 
nature of God and His internal life. This is the condition sine qua non 
to retain theologians’ credibility on the market of contemporary science. 
Moreover, in light of what has been explained, no theological doctrine 
should be  regarded as  final and the true obstacle to  theolgy’s quest 
58 K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, New 
York 1962.
Theology Under Siege: Reflections… 31
for truth is  the enthronization of  any conceptual system as  absolute 
and ultimately indispensable. Theology should always be open towards 
explanative enrichment as the exploration of the loci theologici in hand 
yields new theological data.
Bibliography
Barbour I., Myths, Models, Paradigms. A Comparative Study of Science and Reli-
gion, New York 1976.
Batens D., A General Characterization of Adaptive Logics, Logique et Analyse 
173–175 (2001), p. 45–68.
Bocheński J., Między logiką i wiarą: Z Józefem Bocheńskim rozmawia Jan Parys, 
Montricher 1992.
Brehmer J., Pojęcie duszy w  naukach kognitywnych, Filozofia Chrześcijańska 
7 (2010), p. 37–63.
Brierley M. W., Naming a Quiet Revolution: The Panentheistic Turn in Modern 
Theology, in: P. Clayton, A. Peacocke (eds.), In Whom We Live and Move 
and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific 
World, Grand Rapids–Cambridge 2004, p. 1–14.
Brożek B., Mączka J., Grygiel W. P., Philosophy in Science: Methods and Appli-
cations, Kraków 2011.
Chakravartty A., A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobserv-
able, Cambridge 2007.
Crisp O. D., Rea M. C., Analytic Theology, Oxford 2009.
Dadaczyński J., What Kind of  Logic Does Contemporary Theology Need?, in: 
B. Brożek, A. Olszewski, M. Hohol, Logic in Theology, Kraków 2013, p. 39–60.
Damasio A., Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain, New York 
2010.
Dawkins R., The God Delusion, Boston–New York 2008.
Einstein A., Ernst Mach, Physikalische Zeitschrift 17/7 (1916), p. 101–104.
Ford L. S., The Viability of Whitehead’s God for Christian Theology, Proceedings 
of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 44 (1970), p. 141–151.
Gilson E., Methodical Realism, Front Royal 1990.
Grygiel W.  P., Physics in  the Service of  Theology: A  Methodological Inquiry, 
in: B. Brożek, A. Olszewski, M. Hohol, Logic in Theology, Kraków 2013, 
p. 293–308.
Hawking S., Mlodinow L., The Great Design, London–Toronro–Sydney–
Auckland–Johannesburg 2010.
Wojciech P. Grygiel32
Heisenberg W., Physics and Philosophy, New York 1958.
Heller M., Michalik A., Życiński J.  (red.), Filozofować w  kontekście nauki, 
Kraków 1987.
Heller M., Philosophy of  Chance. A  Cosmic Fugue with a  Prelude and a  Coda, 
Kraków 2012.
Heller M., Sens życia i sens Wszechświata, Tarnów 2002.
Heller M., Wszechświat i słowo, Kraków 1981.
Hodgson P. C., Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion, Oxford 2005.
Isham C., Lectures on Quantum Theory, London 1995.
Keane G. J., Creation Rediscovered, Rockford–Illinois 1999.
Krąpiec M., Poznawać czy myśleć, Lublin 1994.
Łukasiewicz J., O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa, Warszawa 1987.
McFague S., The Body of God: An Ecological Theology, Minneapolis 1993.
Murphey N., Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, Ithaca–London 1990.
Norton J., The Physical Content of  General Covariance, in: J.  Eisenstaedt, 
A. Knox (eds.), Studies in the History of General Relativity: Einstein Studies, 
vol. 3, Boston 1992, p. 281–315.
Obolevitch T., Kilka uwag na  temat relacji fizyki i  metafizyki u  Arystotelesa, 
in: S.  Wszołek, R.  Janusz (red.), Wyzwania racjonalności, Kraków 2006, 
p. 472–486.
Owens J., Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry, Huston 1992.
Pieper J., Scholasticsim: Personalities and Problems of  Mediaeval Philosophy, 
South Bend 2001.
Polkinghorne J., One World: The Interaction of  Science and Theology, London 
1986.
Popper K., Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of  Scientific Knowledge, 
New York 1962.
Psillos S., Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, London–New York 1999.
Russell R.  J., Murphy N., Peacocke A., Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Per-
spectives on Divine Action, California 2001.
Russell R. J., Clayton P., Wegter-McNelly K., Polkinghorne J., Quantum Me-
chanics: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, California 1995.
Spence S. A., The Actor’s Brain: Exploring the Cognitive Science of Free Will, Ox-
ford 2009.
Tomasello M., Historia naturalna ludzkiego myślenia, Kraków 2015.
Torretti R., Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré, London 1978.
Worall J., Structural Realism: The Best of  Both Worlds?, Dialectica 43  (1989), 
p. 99–124.
Theology Under Siege: Reflections… 33
Zabieglik S., Krzywe zwierciadło filozofii, czyli dzieje pojęcia zdrowego rozsądku, 
Warszawa 1987.
Życiński J., Świat matematyki i jej materialnych cieni, Kraków 2013.
Życiński J., Teizm i filozofia analityczna, t. 2, Kraków 1988.
